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Objective translational error 
and the cultural norm of translation 
Brian Mossop 
1. Objective Identification of Error 
In l'Analyse du discours comme méthode de traduction, Jean Delisle 
gives a lengthy argument to justify his proposed French translation of 
the expression « a sense of loss » in a newspaper article which begins : 
After the removal of her left breast Une Newyorkaise de 54 ans, Mme 
because of cancer in 1970, Mrs. Joan Dawson, subit en 1970 l'abla-
Joan Dawson, 54, of New York tion du sein gauche atteint de cancer 
City spent the next three years bat- et passa les trois années suivantes à 
tling depression and a sense of loss. lutter contre la dépression et le trau-
matisme de la mutilation. 
In my view, the underlined expression is an example of trans-
lational error. The problem with this specific rendering will be conside-
red in section 3 below. In the first two sections, I will set out the 
basis for this judgment. 
I want to suggest that the concept 'translational error' be defined 
in an objective and narrow manner. 'Objective' translation evaluation 
usually refers to an evaluation system that will let different evaluators 
arrive at similar conclusions. Here, however, 'objective' translational 
error means error which is identified without any reference to the 
goals of the translator vis-a-vis the readers of the translation, and 
without direct reference to the translator 's interpretation of the text 
'message \ 
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What I propose is that the criteria for assessment be drawn from 
the translational norm of the target culture : a given rendering will be 
deemed to be a 'non-translation' if it fails to conform to the concept 
of translation predominant in the target culture. This has the virtue of 
providing an external standard for translation assessment—as opposed 
to a standard that is merely agreed upon among professional translators. 
Besides, it will surely be granted that approaching the concept of error 
without at least giving due consideration to the cultural norm would 
constitute a major theoretical oversight. 
To use the cultural norm of translation as a criterion of correct 
translation goes contrary to prevailing trends in translation pedagogy 
and evaluation. Indeed, it is customary to ridicule the cultural norm 
of translation, in the form of disparaging remarks about 'transcoding' 
or 'formal equivalence'. But advocates of this customary approach 
succeed only in demolishing a parody of the translating norm. Having 
shot down easy targets in journalistic translation or the translation of 
tourist brochures—usually bits of nonsense which do not at all represent 
the norm—they proceed to replace the norm with one or another of 
the ways of translating prescribed by professional translators, translation 
teachers, and translation theorists. { 
This substitute norm is typically defined in terms of the activity 
of the translator vis-a-vis the readers. The translator constructs a 
'message' from the source text and then composes a new text re-
expressing this message for readers within the target culture. A transla-
tion is erroneous if (in one view) it fails to sound like an original to 
the readers while having an equivalent functional impact on them, or 
(in another view) if it fails to have whatever impact the translating 
institution wants it to have. 
In the substitute norm, it is the shaping work of the translator, 
as a cross-cultural text-interpreter and text-producer, which defines 
what translation is, and therefore how translation should be evaluated. 
For example, Larose (1988, p. 196) writes that « il existe des manières 
de traduire, donc des modes d'évaluation suivant l'intention de traduc-
tion (but du second énonciateur), facteur auquel doit être subordonné 
tout autre paramètre de traduction». 
1. Here is a typical statement of a substitute norm : « The idea must be abandoned 
that translation is merely a matter of isolated words... translation begins with the 
text-in-situation as an integral part of the cultural background, whereby text-
analysis proceeds from the macro-structure of the text to the micro-unit of the 
word, this being seen, not as an isolatable item, but in its relevance and function 
within the text. Furthermore, the text cannot be considered as a static specimen 
of language... but essentially as the verbalized expression of an author's intention 
as understood by the translator as reader, who then recreates this whole for 
another readership in another culture. » (Snell-Hornby, 1988, p. 2). 
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Readers may at this point think they are about to hear an 
argument for some form of literal translation. Not so. My proposal is 
that every text which is to be presented as a translation needs to 
undergo two separate evaluations : an evaluation in accordance with 
the cultural norm, and an evaluation as a piece of writing for a 
readership. It is in this sense that my proposal is for a narrow concept 
of translational error : only shortcomings detected during the first kind 
of evaluation will be called errors in translation. 
The proposed approach is thus radically different from one which 
begins by looking at the macro-features of the translating situation 
(genre, readership, overall text function and so forth), and then assesses 
micro-level features (the translation of individual words, phrases and 
sentences) in terms of their contribution to achieving goals derived 
from the macro-level. My proposal is for unrelated macro-level and 
micro-level assessments. The micro-level would be assessed using 
criteria which do not take into account macro-level factors, because 
these are irrelevant to deciding whether a text is a good translation, 
as far as the cultural norm is concerned. 
It is not hard to see that the results of the two assessments may 
well conflict : what the first assessment calls an error in translation 
may nevertheless be deemed a good piece of writing. But this is not 
a problem. The conflict reflects the reality of different cultural standards 
for writing and for translation (and perhaps also the fundamental 
contradiction at the heart of translation). 
In practical evaluation work, it will simply be a matter of deciding 
when the writing criteria can override the translation criteria. 'Overrid-
ing' may be allowable, desirable, or even necessary in certain passages 
of a text, but if the number of overridings goes beyond a certain 
point, then the result, however valuable as a piece of writing, can no 
longer count as a translation (though it may be produced by someone 
who is called a translator). In this article, the writing criteria and the 
criteria for overriding will not be discussed. 
I do want to emphasize that what is being considered here is 
translation evaluation, not translation procedure. Nothing that is said 
below should be taken to imply that translators should first translate 
literally and then decide when 'overriding' is allowable. By no means 
should translators proceed as if « the text [were] a linear sequence of 
units, and translation...a transcoding process involving the substitution 
of a sequence of equivalent units» (Snell-Hornby, 1988, p. 16), even 
if this is interpreted broadly to allow the substitution of equivalent 
cultural items. Rather, as translators work, they must of course identify 
the pattern of meaning that shapes the text and make inferences on the 
basis of the text as a whole and on the basis of their cultural, factual 
and situational knowledge, their knowledge of genres, their knowledge 
57 
of the targetted readers, and so forth. What is being considered here 
is the final result, not the procedure that leads to it. 
Before looking at the cultural norm of translation, I want to 
indicate its value as an objective means of identifying translational 
error, through a comparison with the alternatives : 
(i) Equivalent effect : as Newmark (1988, p. 48) points out, 
the test of equivalent effect can be objectively applied only 
with texts that call on the reader to perform some action 
(like filling out an income tax form). Also, translators do 
not always aim for equivalent effect, and when they do 
not, it is still necessary to have a way of evaluating 
correspondence to the source text. 2 
(ii) Conformance to extratextual facts : again, this test can be 
applied only to certain kinds of text or certain passages 
within a text (e.g. a description of a piece of equipment). 
(iii) Conformance to authorial intent : this test can be applied 
only when the author is available to state what his or her 
intent was, and even then there are three problems : the 
author may have forgotten ; texts can convey cultural mean-
ings of which the author is not aware ; and texts can 
accumulate meanings over time independent of what their 
authors intended. 
(iv) Conformance to textual intent : the problem here is that 
not everyone believes in the objective existence of 'the 
intent of a text' ; there is a vast literature on text interpreta-
tion, ranging from ultra-subjectivism (every reading of a 
text is equally valid) to ultra-objectivism (there is only one 
valid reading). 
By contrast, the cultural norm of translation has an undeniable 
objective existence (whose content, I hope to show, can be specified), 
and the test of conformance to the norm is applicable to every text 
(though the result is only a partial assessment of each text, since the 
norm does not cover every aspect of a translator's work). 
2. In « Translating institutions : a missing factor in translation theory » (777?, Vol. 
1, no. 2), I mentioned the much discussed case of the Strachey translation of 
Freud, where terminology taken from everyday German (« das Ich ») is rendered 
by Latinate English (« the Ego ») — a case of deliberately changing meaning in 
order to make psychoanalysis sound like science. I suggested that the term 
'mistranslation' not be applied to such cases but be restricted to changes in 
meaning that arise from carelessness or defective knowledge on the part of the 
translator. What I propose now is that the term 'non-translation' be applied to 
renderings like Ich = Ego. Both 'mistranslations' and 'non-translations' are 
'translational errors'. 
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2. The cultural norm of translation 
The cultural norm I will be discussing is the one prevalent in my own 
English-speaking culture. I will not consider the degree of similarity 
to the norm in different or even related cultures.3 
To identify the norm, what is really needed is an empirical 
study. This might involve a questionnaire administered to a group of 
unilingual speakers of the target language, as well as to a group of 
target-language speakers who can read the source language reasonably 
well. After a few questions designed to elicit a 'definition' of transla-
tion, bilingual respondents would be shown a variety of actual transla-
tions with their sources, and then asked questions about them (about 
individual passages and even words as well as about the text as a 
whole). The unilingual respondents would be shown translations at the 
'literal' end of the scale, to determine the acceptability of various 
degrees of 'translationese'. 
The main goal would be to determine what respondents would 
actually accept as translation (vs non-translation) and, secondarily, 
what they would accept as good translation (vs bad translation). A 
further goal might be to relate these assessments of actual texts to 
respondents' ideal definitions of translation. 
Such a study — which I have not conducted — would doubtless 
produce some apparent self-contradictions within responses, as well 
as some responses that appear to contradict others. Nevertheless I 
believe that certain recurrent themes would emerge, and it is a worth-
while exercise to speculate about what these might be, if only as a 
way of bringing out questions that will need answering in any actual 
empirical study of the norm. 
What I have done below is set out, on the basis of personal 
intuition and experience, what might be called a 'reasonable version' 
of the cultural norm of (written) translation. It will be seen that the 
specifications do not constitute anything like an algorithm, but that is 
because we are talking about a cultural norm for human translators, 
not a program for machine translation. 
3. Antoine Berman (1988, p. 34) writes : « Il faut reconnaître qu'un Anglo-Saxon, 
un Allemand et un Français ne pensent pas... la 'traduction' de la même manière. 
Traduction, translation et Übersetzung ne 'se traduisent' pas mutuellement. » And 
specifically concerning French, he claims : « La langue française, elle, voit dans 
l'acte de traduire l'acclimatation adaptatrice de l'étranger. » This is certainly quite 
different from what I am claiming is the English concept — heavily oriented 
toward the notion of correspondences with the source-text wording. Berman 
writes that « la langue anglaise ne traduit pas, elle translate, c'est-à-dire fait 
circuler des « contenus » qui, en eux-mêmes, sont de nature translinguistique » 
(p. 33). This notion of translation as international circulation of supposedly 
culturally neutral, universal meanings may well be an aspect of the English norm. 
Close interviewing of the sort suggested in section 2 might clarify the matter. 
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(i) Wherever the target language has the necessary structural 
devices, the translation has to by and large follow the 
source text small-unit-by-small-unit (word, phrase, clause, 
sentence). For each unit in the source, there must generally 
speaking be a formally similar unit in the translation, and 
corre-
sponding units must in most cases be in the same order. 
Both the order principle and the structure-for-a-structure principle 
apply fairly rigidly to sentences, and with decreasing rigidity to smaller 
units. The order of sentences in the translation must follow that of the 
original, while the order of clauses, phrases and words is more flexible. 
Translating an abstract noun by an abstract noun ( «lors de son 
arrivée » by « at the time of his arrival » rather than « when he arrived ») 
would not necessarily be required, whereas replacing an interrogative 
sentence by an interrogative sentence normally would be. 
Thus a translation, according to the norm, is a text that is 
prepared from the wordings (lexical and syntactic choices) of the 
source text, and this manner of preparation is reflected in the result. 
Merely conveying the 'message' is not sufficient. Rendering « le rythme 
de reproduction des baleines est trop lent pour supporter une pêche 
intensive » as « since whales do not reproduce quickly enough, intensive 
harvesting is ruled out» is non-translation. (These two sentences might 
appear in 'parallel texts'—texts on the same topic, written independently 
of each other or on the basis of discussion notes.) 
The norm would reject gross violations of target-language gram-
mar : it would thus very often require the order principle to be violated 
at the word level. However, some strangeness in syntax—as in vocabu-
lary and phraseology—is allowed : the norm does not require transla-
tions to read like originals. 
The norm would not be very tolerant of gross defects in inter-
sentence cohesion (unidentifiable antecedents for pronouns, nonsensical 
connective particles, perhaps certain errors in the distribution of given 
and new information), though in other respects my impression is that 
the norm has little to say about structural equivalence above the 
sentence level. 
(ii) In the treatment of the meaning of lexical units (words, 
but sometimes collocations or even larger sequences would 
be accepted as lexical units), the norm calls for a target-
language item, one of whose definitions in an ideal (i.e. 
complete) monolingual dictionary corresponds to (i.e. over-
laps to a fair degree with) a definition of the source-
language item. 
These correspondences can be found, at least in principle, in a 
good bilingual dictionary. While such dictionaries are not created from 
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corpuses of texts and their translations, they nevertheless do very often 
convey the experience of previous translators. They tell us that «pau-
vre» means «poor», and while strictly speaking this may only be 
information about the meaning potential of these words, it also conveys 
the experience of translators—that when Francophones use « pauvre » 
in an actual text, they very frequently mean what Anglophones mean 
when they use «poor». The reason for the frequent success of defini-
tion-based equivalences is simple : the dictionary definitions of corre-
sponding items are based on real textual citations gathered by lexicogra-
phers (some of which are reproduced in good dictionaries to clarify 
the definitions). 
The norm does not require, and indeed often rejects, literal 
translation in the sense of Newmark (1988, p. 69) : following target-
language grammar but rendering every lexical unit by its statistically 
most common out-of-context equivalent in the other language. This 
kind of substitution achieves near perfect success only with a few 
frozen expressions and with standardized technical terms, though as 
Newmark points out (p. 68), it does work surprisingly often in other 
cases as well. 
Not only does the norm allow (and often require) expressions 
like «prendre connaissance de» and «exercice d'évacuation» to be 
treated as single units ( «peruse», «fire drill»), but also collocational 
information can be considered ( «pauvre» = «low», not «poor», in 
« minerai pauvre en métal »). Further, the topic of a text can be taken 
into account, just as it is in a good bilingual dictionary : nothing in 
the norm requires that French «nuage» be rendered as «cloud» in 
statistics texts, where one frequently finds reference to a « nuage de 
points » (a « cluster » or « scatter » of points around a line on a graph). 
I will not attempt to specify any further the degree and kinds of 
contextual reference allowed by the norm (but see the discussion of 
Delisle's translation in section 3 below, for a kind of extratextual 
appeal that is not included in 'context'). 
To sum up on this point, translation according to the norm is 
to a great extent a matter of 'dictionary equivalence', but the dictionary 
is conceived as a high-quality commercial lexicographical product (not 
a list of the 'signifiés' of linguistic theory), and it is assumed to be 
used by an intelligent human being, not a machine. 
(iii) In the popular view of translation, the translated text is 
deemed to be 'by' the author of the source text. It is 
expected that the message is arriving from the point of 
view of the same 'voice' that is addressing the readers of 
the source text. 
Whenever we read anything, we construct a picture of its 
source—the 'voice' that is addressing us (Mossop, 1987). This image 
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may be that of an individual about whom we have independent knowl-
edge, or it may simply be a category of person ('Quebec nuclear 
scientist') or an institution (a company describing warranty conditions 
on one of its products). The fact that translators have to construct a 
substitute 'voice', which is nevertheless supposed to be addressing the 
reader from the same viewpoint, may or may not be signalled by a 
certain degree of unidiomatic language ('translationese') — which the 
norm allows within limits. 
This 'same voice' feature of the norm is formalized in the 
grammatical conventions of translation. In casual oral interpretation, 
«je me sens malade» can come out as «she says she isn't feeling 
well », where the voice addressing the listener is that of the interpreter 
reporting what has been said. But in written translation, the result 
will be «I feel ill», where «I» will be taken as the 'voice' of the 
source text if the text is presented as or understood to be a translation. 4 
An example of what this means is that the norm-following 
translator cannot replace sexist wordings with non-sexist wordings, 
because then the 'voice' addressing the reader will be dramatically 
changed. 
This third feature of the norm in a way implies the other two : 
because the translation is taken as coming to the reader from the same 
'addressing position' as the original, it follows that the wordings of 
the source text are not a mere key to unlocking the structure of a 
textual message, for they are the wordings that were selected at that 
'position'. So small units of the source text have to be replaced with 
their conventional equivalents as much as possible. The norm sees 
translation as basically a translinguistic operation, rather than an opera-
tion that moves a textual message from one culture to another. 
The concern of the norm with wordings is especially clear in the 
frequent use by journalists of expressions like « said the Prime Minister 
in French», following a direct-discourse quotation in English. Or 
consider the following extract from a letter to the Toronto Star by one 
of the Prime Minister's officials, concerning an interview the Prime 
Minister gave to a Paris newspaper : 
The exact words [the PM] used, taken from the transcript of his interview 
with Le Figaro, were as follows : « Even if you would want it, ...» (23 
Aug 89) [my emphasis] 
4. Here is an example of overriding this aspect of the norm. I sometimes have 
occasion to translate letters from semi-literate members of the public complaining 
about their treatment by the unemployment insurance authorities. Following the 
translation norm could unfavourably impress officials who are prejudiced against 
the uneducated. On the other hand, 'improving' the writing could work against 
the complainant if the official who deals with the case has a prejudice in favour 
of the uneducated. My solution is to use indirect speech, making it clear that the 
voice addressing the official is the translator's : (« Mr. X says he was treated 
rudely... »). 
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3. Application of the Norm to Evaluation 
The 'reasonable version' of the cultural norm which I have set out 
allows for a considerable range of translation modes. It excludes all 
but occasional word-for-word renderings, and literal translations in 
Newmark's sense (defined above). But it includes other notions of 
literal translation, as well as Newmark's 'semantic' translation, and 
perhaps to some extent even his 'communicative' translation.5 
However no definition can give a clear idea of what the norm 
includes and excludes. What is needed is to see, via detailed considera-
tion of a number of actual translations, how the norm applies to each 
of the various aspects of translation work. There is no space for such 
lengthy consideration here, but among the matters to be considered are : 
(i) What if anything does the norm have to say about making 
material that is explicit in the source text implicit in the 
translation, and vice versa? This begins with very simple 
cases, like replacing the second of two noun-phrases in 
French (eg «ces oiseaux...cette avifaune... ») with a pro-
noun ( «the birds...they »). At the other end of the scale 
are cases of leaving the reader to make deductions based 
on subject-matter knowledge. The latter are non-transla-
tions, to be judged on the basis of writing criteria (e.g. 
whether the readers have the knowledge to recover concepts 
left implicit in the translation or, given the type of text, 
can be expected to go and acquire the knowledge). As for 
the replacement of French noun-phrases by pronouns, often 
this is either a stylistic requirement or it is essential to the 
'mechanical readability' of the text. In the latter case, 
failure to replace may offend not just writing criteria but 
translation criteria as well : in certain cases, the norm 
might reject such failure in the same way it rejects gross 
grammatical error. 
5. The third definition of literal translation in Roberts (1988) reads : « the translator 
attempts to be faithful to the source text and original author by concentrating 
on the smaller units of the source text and by staying as close as possible to the 
style and primary meanings of the source text while ensuring the functional 
equivalence of the target text... » (p. 13). « Functional equivalence » here refers 
to equivalent effect on target readers. Compare this to Newmark's 'communica-
tive' translation, which gives « the exact contextual meaning of the original in 
such a way that both content and language are readily acceptable and comprehen-
sible to the readership» (1988, p. 47). Newmark's 'semantic' translation just 
gives « the exact contextual meaning of the original within the constraints of the 
TL grammatical structures » (p. 46). (See the discussion under point (ii) of section 
2 for what I take to be included in 'contextual meaning'.) What all these 
definitions share is a strong emphasis on the wordings which the source-text 
author chose, while allowing, within that constraint, for varying degrees of 
attention to easing the task of the target-language reader. 
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(ii) When translators also act as editors, 'correcting' the poor 
compositional habits of their source authors, is that non-
translation? I think so, but it is often necessary. The 
translator may sometimes have to use writing norms only, 
ignoring the translation norm. 
(iii) Does the norm allow for correction when the wording 
contradicts what the translator knows extralinguistically to 
be the truth of the matter, or contradicts another passage 
in the text? No, but non-translation may be justifiable, and 
if it isn't, the norm allows for limited use of translator's 
notes. 
(iv) What about cases where the translator 'fudges' because 
he or she does not know which of two or more possible 
meanings is intended ? It may be that the norm does not 
contemplate the possibility of the translator being unable 
to understand the source text. 
(v) Does the norm have anything to say about genre conven-
tions ? As far as page-layout matters are concerned, I think 
the answer is no. With respect to formulas like letter 
closings, «je vous prie d'agréer...» could be treated by 
the norm either as a single lexical item (with equivalent 
« yours truly » or whatever), or as a sequence of items for 
special—archaic or humorous—effect ( «I beg you to ac-
cept...»). With respect to the mode of addressing the 
reader, rendering a third-person declarative style in a 
French teacher's manual ( «L'étudiant rédigera deux 
textes... ») by a second-person imperative style in English 
( «Have the student write two papers... ») would, I think, 
constitute non-translation, but writing criteria could over-
ride the norm. 
(vi) What does the norm have to say about the translation of 
culture-specific metaphor: copy, replace or eliminate? 
What about place names and names of specific cultural 
entities : should one speak of the National Assembly in 
Québec or the provincial legislature in Quebec City ? Tradi-
tion calls for « National Assembly in Quebec City », which 
illustrates what may be a more general feature of the 
norm : cultural items should not be replaced with equiva-
lents if the reader can understand the unadapted form 
without too much effort ( «Québec» often has to be 
replaced because of the risk of confusion with the name 
of the province), but the norm does not require immediate 
comprehensibility. 
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Thus a reasonable version of the norm would, I think, allow 
for various treatments of 'cultural' expressions in the source 
text, from direct transcription of the source-language ex-
pression accompanied by an explanation, to substitution of 
an explanatory description, to replacement with an equiva-
lent. 
(vii) Translators often find that they cannot simultaneously ren-
der the informational content and the emotive connotation 
of an expression, and one or the other has to be sacrificed, 
with or without compensatory addition elsewhere. The 
norm probably allows for this, as seen in the popular notion 
«something got lost in the translation». 
This list could go on, but the purpose here is merely to suggest 
rather than conclusively demonstrate the feasibility and value of a 
separate evaluation of translations in accordance with the cultural norm. 
I will just give one example of the application of the norm, using the 
passage from Jean Delisle's book reproduced at the outset of the article. 
For the sake of argument, I will pretend that Delisle was writing 
about translation into English, so that I can avoid the question of 
whether the norm in Quebec or France is different. I use Delisle 
because I have not found a similar detailed argument for a case of 
French-to-English translation. The question of whether writing critera 
would justify overriding the translational norm in this particular case 
will not be considered, since it depends on the aim of the translator—a 
matter Delisle does not discuss. 
Delisle begins (p. 105) by saying that « a sense of loss » 
a un sens unique à ce contexte-ci même si l'expression existe en anglais 
et est couramment en usage dans les notices nécrologiques... Cette 
combinaison lexicale est dans ce discours anglais un emploi personnel 
et original. 
Delisle appears to conclude that there is no connection with 
obituaries at all, for without any further argument, he completely 
abandons the usual meaning of the expression and its parts. He stops 
translating small units and substitutes a meaning he believes to be 
implicit, given his interpretation of the text as a whole : 
Le co-texte ou contexte immédiat (...three years battling depression... 
Most women in the same situation turn to a psychiatrist) renvoie...à la 
partie de la médecine qui étudie et traite les troubles émotifs, les 
pathologies de la vie psychique. Perçu sous cet éclairage, « a sense of 
loss » évoque un choc émotionnel violent occasionné par la perte d'un 
sein. Ce choc émotionnel serait à l'origine de l'état dépressif... de 
Mme Dawson, (p. 109) 
There are two problems here. First, Delisle is trying to make 
his translation of « sense of loss » give the cause of the depression. 
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But nothing in the text suggests that Mrs. Dawson's sense of loss was 
a step on the road to ( «à l'origine de») her depression. The two 
expressions are simply joined by «and», and «depression» precedes 
« sense of loss ». The English does not say or imply « sense of loss 
and (consequently) depression». 
The other problem is that if «traumatisme» means, as Delisle 
says, « un choc émotionnel violent », then it is far too strong for « sense 
of loss». A sense of loss is not a sharp, strong feeling, but a diffuse 
melancholy. If I were back-translating « le traumatisme de la mutila-
tion », I would write « the shock of disfigurement » — something which 
has doubtless been experienced by other women who have had mastec-
tomies, and might well be said in this sort of text, but was not said 
or implied in this text. Why assume that Mrs. Dawson was experiencing 
the same degree of trauma that would have led « most women » to 
consult a psychiatrist, especially since she went to a plastic surgeon 
instead ? 
The meaning of « sense of loss » can be obtained by a slight 
modification of the obituarial meaning. When we feel a sense of loss 
on the death of a loved one, our attention is focussing on the fact that 
in our conceptual/emotional picture of the world we inhabit, a space 
or position that was once occupied is now empty. The parallel to 
Mrs. Dawson's situation is clear : her breast occupied a certain position 
in her mental self-concept. 
Delisle gives a list of translations suggested by his students. It 
includes «le vide qu'elle éprouvait» (p. 108), which seemed fully 
acceptable to a few Francophone translators I checked it with. The 
relevant entries for « vide » in the Lexis and Robert dictionaries are : 
sentiment de privation (la mort du père a fait un grand vide) (L) ; ce 
qui est ressenti comme un manque (son départ fait un grand vide) (R) 
Alternatively, «sentiment de privation» itself could be used, or 
else «vide émotif», if it is thought desirable to avoid any suggestion 
of a physical hole rather than a mental one. These all correspond in 
a clear way to the relevant meanings of « sense » and « loss » as given 
in Webster 's : 
sense — an awareness or feeling of a particular nature resulting from 
a particular stimulus (a sudden sense of warmth on entering the house) ; 
a self-conscious motivating awareness or conviction (tried to control his 
sense of injury) 
loss — the harm or privation resulting from losing or being separated 
from something or someone (bore up bravely under the loss of both 
parents) 
Delisle's translation offends the norm because it renders concepts 
which the translator believes (rightly or wrongly) are implicit in the 
text, and ignores the source author's word choices. 
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4. Where is the boundary between translation and non-translation ? 
It is worth quoting at length Delisle's views on the limits of translation : 
Il y a une limite que le traducteur doit s'interdire de franchir. Dans les 
milieux canadiens de la traduction, une nouvelle tendance se dessine... 
Conscients du danger (réel) d'atrophie qui menace une langue s'expri-
mant plus souvent à travers des traductions que dans un emploi original, 
comme c'est le cas du français au Canada, des traducteurs et réviseurs... 
se font les adeptes d'une forme de « réécriture élégante »... Cette pratique 
n'ouvre-t-elle pas la voie à une version moderne des « belles infidèles » ? 
Par nature, la traduction suit le cheminement général du texte original 
et, par conséquent, elle peut difficilement prendre la forme d'une « varia-
tion sur un thème connu» ou d'une «imitation». Ces exercices de 
rédaction sont en fait des adaptations libres qui n'osent dire leur nom. 
(p. 118) 
Here is Delisle's conception of an 'adaptation' of the passage 
we have been considering : 
Non, ce n'était plus tenable. Mme Dagenais, Montréalaise de 54 ans, 
ne pouvait plus supporter l'état dépressif qui l'accablait depuis trois 
ans. L'ablation d'un sein l'avait profondément affectée. Son moral était 
au plus bas. (p. 118) 
But this is too clear a case of non-translation. While there will 
inevitably be a gray area between translation and non-translation, 
Delisle does not show how his concept of non-translation applies in a 
not-so-clear case. 
He does, however, go a bit further than the rather vague «la 
traduction suit le cheminement général du texte original », cited above. 
In discussing what he calls the « analyse justificative » of a proposed 
translation, Delisle says that the point of the analysis is to determine 
«dans quelle mesure la formulation retenue est conforme au sens du 
passage original, ou, plus exactement, à son interprétation personnelle 
du vouloir-dire de l'auteur du texte» (p. 83). 
The problem as I see it with Delisle's approach is precisely that 
he wants to justify translations solely by reference to the translator's 
interpretation of the authorial or textual intent, with no reference to 
the wordings of the source text. This leaves open far too wide a scope 
for the subjectivity of both the translator and the translation evaluator. 
In his discussion of justificatory analysis, Delisle gives the 
following warning : « Une interprétation objectivement fausse peut don-
ner lieu à une justification subjectivement logique. » It is not clear to 
me how Delisle decides that an interpretation is « objectivement fausse », 
but he does explain « subjectivement logique » : one can become very 
attached to one's own interpretation, « surtout lorsqu'il est impossible 
de s'appuyer sur des évidences linguistiques et factuelles» (p. 83). 
The point I have been trying to make here is that Delisle does not 
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give enough weight to «les évidences linguistiques». His approach 
takes the translator's and the evaluator's attention away too quickly 
from the actual words the author has chosen and focusses it on the 
overall context, which then plays a preponderant role in determining 
what meaning is assigned to any given passage. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In much contemporary writing about translation, there is often a 
confusion between observations and discoveries about translation on 
the one hand, and on the other hand prescriptions about how 
people—translators, employers, teachers, clients, the public—ought to 
view (and hence evaluate) translation. 
The prescriptive aspect is tied up with how translators hope to 
be treated, namely, in a manner as far removed as possible from 
what would be dictated by the view that translation is basically word 
replacement and can therefore be automated. In the past two decades, 
translators have sought to define themselves—against the cultural 
norm—as professional intercultural communications experts, and thus 
to position themselves favourably for an important role in the 'new 
information order' which is supposedly coming into being. 
It is perfectly legitimate to claim that we have discovered that 
translation cannot be modelled by the word replacement procedure of 
early (or even more recent) machine-translation experiments. The 
word replacement model of MT (and of stereotyped versions of the 
cultural norm) is certainly too simple to describe translation as it is 
conceived by either the reader-oriented text-theorists or the more 
source-oriented cultural norm. 
It may also be the case, as some practitioners and teachers of 
oral interpretation have claimed, that word replacement can play only 
a minor role in the conditions under which spoken translation is 
performed. There is simply no time to pay close attention to wordings, 
and immediate comprehension by the listeners is paramount since, 
unlike readers, they cannot 'listen slowly' or 'relisten'.6 
6. Danica Seleskovitch, a leading proponent of the view that translation is the 
rendering of the translator's interpretation of discoursal meaning, not of the 
wordings of the text, says that in writing, unlike in spoken discourse, « le discours 
devient accessible non plus seulement dans sa partie sens mais aussi dans la 
langue dont il est fait... La formulation linguistique subsiste ainsi de plein droit... 
Le traducteur ne peut pas pour autant se dispenser de l'interpréter et de lui 
donner le sens qui lui paraît le plus probant ; mais on comprendrait mal qu'il 
ne respecte pas cette vie linguistique indépendante et qu'il ne fasse pas le 
maximum d'effort pour rapprocher sa traduction des formes linguistiques de 
l'original » (Seleskovitch, 1976, p. 79). This prompts the questions « how much 
of an effort ? » and « what is the required degree of rapprochement ?» A few 
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But it does not follow from any of this that written translation 
is, by nature, wholly different from what the word replacement model 
suggests. No Chinese wall can properly be erected between translating 
'words' on the one hand and translating 'ideas' or translating ianguage-
in-situation' on the other. The notion that translation is a rendering 
not of 'langue' but of 'parole' is too simplistic. 
Professional translators may want translation to be conceived as 
utterly different from word replacement, and they may be trying to 
change the cultural norm of translation, but unless such a change 
actually comes about and translation is re-conceived by the public as 
just another kind of writing-for-readers, the existing cultural norm 
stands, as an objective limit and control on what counts as translation. 
Its objectivity is twofold. First, like any norm, it has an objective 
social existence. Second, the current norm provides control via its 
reference to the two linguistic systems, which have a social existence 
independent of the source author, the reader of the translation, and 
most importantly, the translator. 
Secretary of State Translation Bureau, and 
York University School of Translation, Toronto 
lines earlier, Seleskovitch describes the work of rapprochement as « un souci 
supplémentaire, celui de respecter le signifié original et de conserver dans une 
certaine mesure [dans quelle mesure ? — BM] les formes originales ». It ail 
sounds a bit like icing on the cake — important for appearances but not really 
essential. The writings of Seleskovitch and her followers often point out that 
writing differs from speech in that linguistic form plays a greater role, but they 
then deny that the difference is really significant. In their view, interpretation 
and (written) translation involve the same basic process of understanding — best 
seen in the spoken mode — and the result should be evaluated in basically the 
same way. «Sur l'essentiel, l'interprétation et la traduction ne diffèrent pas... 
toutes deux se libèrent de l'emprise linguistique de l'original. » (p. 79) 
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